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CHAPTER SIX 
EARLY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
The historical norm in the relationship between church and state is 
some kind of union or accommodation. The concept of a strict separation 
may be no older than the country that first gave it substance. But its 
origin is religious rather than secular. The religious dissident, Roger 
Williams, coined the phrase "wall of separation" long before Thomas 
Jefferson penned his famous letter to the Danbury Baptist Association or 
Justice Hugo Black equated it with the First Amendment guarantees. In a 
letter to John Cotton written in 1644, several years after Williams had 
been banished from Massachusetts, he criticized the establishment 
concept, citing as proof against it 
. the faithful labors of many witnesses of Jesus Christ, extant 
to the world, abundantly proving that the church of the Jews under 
the Old Testament in the type, and the church of the Christians 
under the New Testament in the antitype, were both separate from 
the World; and that vJhen they have opened a gap in the hedge or 
wall of separation between the garden of the church and the 
wilderness of the world, God hath ever broke down the wall itself, 
removed the candlestick, and made His garden a wilderness, as at 
this day. And that therefore if He will ever please to restore His 
garden and paradise again, it must of necessity be walled in 
peculiarly unto Himself from the world; and that all that shall be 
saved out of the world are to be transplanted out 9f the wilderness 
of the world, and added unto his church or garden. 
The image of a wall of separation (Ezek. 42:20) is comparable to 
the motif of a hedge protecting the church from the wilderness (Ps. 
80:12; Isa. 5:1-9; Ezek. 22:30), which was common to Puritan thought. 
The difference is that Williams believed a strict separation was 
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necessary to preserve the purity of the church, while Cotton--probably 
with the example of Nehemiah in mind--believed that the erection and 
maintenance of the wall was the work of the Christian magistrate. For 
the leaders of Bay Colony, church and state were properly enclosed 
within the wall rather than separated by it. 2 
This disagreement involved--and continues to involve--a basic 
difference of theology. A century later, Isaac Backus, a Baptist leader 
who fought the church establishment of Massachusetts during the War for 
Independence, endorsed Williams as a herald of religious liberty and 
portrayed him as a victim of religious persecution. Although this view 
prevails in the standard histories, it appears to be based on a doubtful 
correlation of this incident and the "Antinomian controversy." Indeed, 
Williams himself denied that religious persecution was a factor in his 
banishment. 3 
It is Thomas Jefferson's use of the phrase "wall of separation," 
however, that has received the most attention. In his letter to the 
Baptists in 1802, President Jefferson wrote: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely 
between Man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his 
faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government 
reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign 
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that 
their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," 4thus building a wall of separation between Church and State. 
EdwardS. Corwin's comment on the phrase and its use by Justice 
Black in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), sheds some 
light on the political considerations--Jefferson's as well as the 
Court's--that have affected its interpretation. 
The eager crusaders on the Court make too much of Jefferson's 
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Danbury letter, which was not improbably motivated by an impish 
desire to heave a brick at the Congregationalist-Federalist 
hierarchy of Connecticut, whose leading members had denounced him 
two years before as an "infidel" and "atheist." A more deliberate, 
more carefully considered evaluation by Jefferson of the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment is that which occurs in his Second 
Inaugural: "In matters of religion, I have considered that its free 
exercise is placed by the constitution independent of the powers of 
the general government." In short, the principal importance of the 
amendment lay in the separation which it effected between the 
respective jurisdictions of state and nation regarding religion, 
rather than in it5 bearing on the question of the separation of 
church and state. 
It is ironic that this letter is taken as an expression of the 
intent of the framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. At 
the time of the Constitutional Convention and the first session of 
Congress, Jefferson was serving as minister to France. He returned only 
after the Bill of Rights had been sent to the states for ratification 
late in 1789. Instead, it was James Madison who drafted the amendments 
and successfully steered them through Congress, even though he did so 
with some reluctance because he believed "the rights in question are 
6 
reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted. While 
Madison conceded that a "properly executed" bill of rights might guard 
against ambitious rulers, he warned that 
... there is great reason to fear that a positive declaration of 
some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the 
requisite latitude. I am sure that the rights of conscience in 
particular, if submitted to public definition would be narrowe9 
much more than they are likely ever to be by an assumed power. 
Madison's reservations about specifying these rights found 
practical expression in the provisions against a narrow construction of 
these rights in the Ninth Amendment and against a broad construction of 
the granted powers in the Tenth Amendment. In any event, the religion 
clauses that were added to Article VI and the First Amendment, like 
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Jefferson's later comments, do not indicate a climate of opinion hostile 
to cooperation between church and state so much as they reflect the 
lengthy, often bitter struggle for disestablishment that had only 
recently been waged in Virginia and was continuing in other states. 
They were understood as precautions against a national establishment of 
religion--however "tolerant" it might be--rather than as a disavowal of 
the fundamentally biblical, and largely Christian, principles on which 
the constitutional system was based. Yet the Supreme Court has resisted 
this understanding in recent years, as Mark DeWolfe Howe observed: 
A frank acknowledgment that, in making the wall of separation a 
constitutional barrier, the faith of Roger Williams played a more 
important part that the doubts of Jefferson probably seemed to the 
present Court to carry unhappy implications. Such an 
acknowledgment might suggest that the First Amendment was designed 
not merely to codify a political principle but to implant a 
somewhat special principle of theology in the Constitution--a 
principle, by no means uncontested, which asserts that a church 
dependent on governmental favor cannot be true to its better 
self .... It is hard for the present generation of emancipated 
Americans to conceive the possibility that the framers of the 
Constitution were willing to incorporate some theological 
presuppositions in the framework of federal government. I find it 
impossible to deny that such presuppositions did find their way 
into the Constitution. To make that admission does not seem to me 
to necessitate the concession which others seem to think it 
entails--the concession that the government created by that 8 Constitution can properly become embroiled in religious turmoil. 
Indeed, this "somewhat special principle of theology" may have 
involved not only Roger Williams' wall of separation against political 
corruption of the church but also John Cotton's hedge of protection 
against religious corruption of the Christian polity. Although the 
restriction of suffrage to church members had disappeared by then, 
similar precautions--such as the use of religious tests--were still 
common. It was only with the assurance--however unrealistic--that 
religious liberty was compatible with this principle that such 
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restrictions were abandoned. 
Disestablishment 
Religious liberty was seen by some of the founders as a means of 
strengthening Christianity through sectarian competition while still 
promoting an essentially biblical standard of law and justice. Even the 
most latitudinarian of the founders were unwilling to disavow ethical 
standards that the Bible makes binding on all times and all nations. A 
century or more was to pass before religious liberalism began to 
successfully challenge traditional Christianity in regard to law and 
morality. 
Virginia 
Prior to 1776, attempts to obtain toleration for religious 
dissenters in Virginia had largely failed. A number of Baptist 
preachers were beaten and jailed. James Madison was prominent among 
those who protested against these persecutions in the name of "liberty 
of conscience.'' Following the Declaration of Independence, a state 
convention was held to organize a new government and draft a 
constitution. Petitions from dissenting churches called for freedom of 
worship, exemption from religious assessments, and disestablishment of 
the Church of England. George Mason submitted a bill of rights that 
included a provision for religious toleration written by Patrick Henry. 
Madison objected to the word "toleration" because of its implication 
that liberty is a matter of grace, not right. He proposed that the 
wording be changed to guarantee "the full and free exercise of religion, 
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according to the dictates of conscience,'' although he added a 
restraining clause: "unless under color of religion the preservation of 
equal liberty and the existence of the State are manifestly 
endangered." 9 
It took time to work out politically the practical implications of 
religious liberty. Among the first concessions were the admission of 
dissenting chaplains to the army and the suspension of church rates. 
While general assessments were ended in 1779, the establishment 
remained. The following year, the validity of marriages performed by 
dissenting ministers was recognized and responsibility for overseeing 
the poor passed from the church vestries to a state office. 10 
Meanwhile, churches of all denominations were being devastated by 
the war. Numerous church building were destroyed and congregations were 
11 deprived of their clergy. In response to this situation, the 
legislature, which was still predominantly Episcopalian in its 
sympathies, passed an act to incorporate the Protestant Episcopal 
Church, then quickly repealed it. The repeal was soon followed by an 
act annulling all laws favoring the Church and dissolving its ties with 
the state. But Patrick Henry sponsored a "Bill Establishing a Provision 
for Teachers of the Christian Religion" vrhich won the support of George 
Washington, Richard Henry Lee, and John Marshall. It appeared close to 
passage when Madison motioned for a postponement of the final vote until 
the next session so that public opinion could be registered. During the 
interim he wrote his famous "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments" in which he observed: 
The same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion 
of all other religions, may establish with the same ease, any 
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particular sect of Christians in exclusion of all other sects, and 
the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three 
pence only of his property for the support of any one 
establishment, may force12im to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever. 
"Establishment,'' for Madison, clearly meant direct tax support for 
churches. Madison's campaign succeeded. The assessment bill was 
defeated the following autumn and Jefferson's Bill for Establishing 
Religious Freedom, first introduced in 1779, was passed in January, 
1789. The last vestige of the old establishment--the glebe lands which 
supported the clergy--did not finally pass away until 1840. 13 
Massachusetts 
Much the same pattern of disestablishment was followed in other 
states, although at a slower pace. In Massachusetts, Isaac Backus 
argued for religious liberty as early as 1774 on the same principle of 
"no taxation without representation" that his fellow patriots used in 
arguing for political liberty, claiming that the legislators 
. . . never were empowered to lay any taxes but what were of a 
civil and worldly nature; and to impose religious taxes is as much 
oct of their jurisdiction, as it can be for Britain to tax 
America .. 
That which has made the greatest noise, is a tax of three pence a 
pound upon tea; but your law of last June laid a tax of the same 
sum every year upon the Baptists in each parish, as they would 
expect to defend themselves against a greater one. And only 
because the Baptists in Middleboro have refused to pay that little 
tax, we hear that the first parish in said town have this fall 
voted -:=o lay a greater tax upon us. All America are alarmed at the 
tea tax; though, if they please, they can avoid it by not buying 
the tea; but we have no such liberty. We must either p2y the 
little tax, or else your people appear even in this time of 
extremity, determined to lay the great one upon us. But these 
lines are to let you know, that we are determined not to pay either 
of them; not only upon your principle of not being taxed where we 
are not represented, but also because we dare not render ttat 
homage to any earthly power, which I and my brethren are fully 
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convinced belongs only to God. We cannot give in the certificates 
you require, without implicitly allowing to men that authority 
which we believe in our consciences belongs only to God. Here, 
therefore, we claim charter rights, liberty of conscience. And if 
any still deny it to us, they must answer to Him who has said, 14 
'With what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.' 
Backus's plea to the Massachusetts legislature in December, 1774 
was unavailing, as was his earlier appeal to the Continental Congress in 
October. Legal oppression of dissenters had long been forbidden by law 
and, although the form of an establishment remained, dissenters could 
direct their church rates to the churches of their choice. Still, this 
law gave opportunity for harassment and was greatly resented. Backus 
continued his campaign, first proposing a bill of rights for 
Massachusetts in 1783 and later approving the prohibition of religious 
tests in the U.S. Constitution. 15 But the establishment held out until 
1833. 
The Dedham Case 
Changes began with the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 
1820 and the Dedham Case of 1818-1821. An effort to dissolve the 
establishment had failed but concessions were made at the Convention. 
But it was a court ruling in favor of the political takeover of the 
First Church of Dedham that finally laid the axe to the root of the 
Congregationalist establishment. After the pastor of the church left in 
1818 to assume the presidency of a college, a faction of Unitarians 
obtained the support of a majority of voters in the parish to elect a 
recent graduate of Harvard Divinity School. The school had been 
Unitarian since the takeover of Harvard in 1805. 
A majority of the church members refused to accept the new pastor 
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and, after the parish--which included non-members--installed him anyway, 
complained to officials about the takeover. A committee dominated by 
Unitarians was called to investigate and decided in favor of the parish, 
claiming that the veto power by the church majority was established in 
custom rather than law. The Trinitarian majority then bolted the church 
and took the records, communion service, and trust deeds with them. The 
Unitarian faction retaliated by excommunicating them for "disorderly 
walking and schism," then sued them for return of the property. The 
case eventually went to the Massachusetts Supreme Court. 
Chief Justice Isaac Parker, who wrote the unanimous opinion in 
Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 487 (1820), was a leader of the 
Federalist-Unitarians. William McLoughlin believes he was motivated by 
a belief that only a broad Erastian policy--allowing majority rule 
within the parishes--could preserve the old establishment. But the 
effect of the ruling was to put Trinitarian Congregationalists into the 
't' f d' t' . 't 16 posl lon o a lssen lng mlnorl y. 
What struck the Trinitarian majority in Dedham even harder was the 
court's claim that once they had seceded from the parish they 
ceased to exist, at least in the eyes of the law (a view consistent 
with the old view that unincorporated religious congregations had 
no legal standing). Starting from the assumption that "Churches as 
such, have no power but that ... of divine worship and church 
order and discipline" in any parish, the court went on to declare 
"The authority of the church" is "invisible" and "as all to civil 
purposes, the secession of a whole church from the parish would be 
an extinction of the church; and it is competent of the members of 
the parish to institute a new church or to engraft one upon the old 
stock if any of it should remain; and this new church would succeed 
to all the rights of the old, in relation to the parish." Somehow 
the Congregational churches had become nothing but the creatures of 
the majority of qualified voters in the19arish. This would have 
shocked the founders of the Bay Colony. 
In the end, disestablishment in Massachusetts came about, as it did 
in Virginia half a century earlier, because of the intrusion of public 
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policy considerations into church affairs to a degree that even offended 
many members of the establishment itself. The Standing Orders of 
Massachusetts were suspended by constitutional amendment in 1833. E. R. 
Norman concluded: 
Even this victory would not have been so easily accomplished had 
not many of the Congregational meeting-houses passed into the hands 
of Unitarian pastors and so offended orthodox Trinitarians that 
they would rather have the churches disestablfshed than countenance 
the propagation of error out of public funds. 
The establishment principle was not yet dead in Massachusetts, 
however: only dormant. Four years later the Unitarian-dominated 
legislature, led by Senate president Horace Mann, established a state 
Board of Education along the lines of the Prussian state school system. 
Mann then resigned from the legislature and became the Board's first 
secretary in order to promote, to use his own words, "faith in the 
improvability of the race,--in their accelerating improvability."19 In 
his study of the origins of the early American public school movement, 
Samuel Blumenfeld comments: 
If the American public school movement took on the tone of a 
religious crusade after Mann became Secretary of the Board of 
Education, it was because Mann himself saw it as a religious 
mission. He accepted the position of Secretary not only because of 
what it would demand of him, but because it would help fulfill the 
spiritual hopes of his friends. They had faith that Mann could 
deliver the secular miracle that would vindicate their v~0w of human nature and justify their repudiation of Calvinism. 
This new establishment was by far a more subtle one but still noticeably 
religious in character. It came complete with a system of secular 
seminaries called normal schools and was later reinforced by compulsory 
attendance laws. The expressly "non-sectarian" religious purpose of the 
schools helps account for the opposition from many orthodox pastors and 
school masters as well as the controversy among various religious 
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traditions--both pro and con--it generated throughout the remainder of 
21 the century. If the practice of intruding politics into religion was 
simply a matter of habit, it was certainly proving to be a difficult one 
to break. 
The Myth of Neutrality 
In a manner of speaking, the habit of intruding politics into 
religion--or religion into politics--is not only a difficult one to 
break but impossible. A religiously or politically neutral--or purely 
objective--standard of law and government is as unimaginable as it is 
impracticable. This is not to say that, by itself, any particular 
system of belief legally qualifies as a religion or even plays the role 
of one. For example, the Supreme Court has wrestled for years with the 
problem of defining religion so as to include some non-theistic systems 
of belief while not wishing at the same time to give credence to every 
pretense, prejudice, or preference that calls itself a religion. The 
Court conceives religion at once too broadly and too narrowly. The 
point is that any belief assumes a complete cultural or ideological 
ensemble of which it is only one artifact. It is this ensemble that 
represents the kind of ''ultimate concern" that Paul Tillich identified 
as religious. "Every law order is an establishment of religion," as R. 
J. Rushdoony repeatedly emphasizes. 22 "The point is this: all law is 
enacted morality and presupposes a moral system, a moral law, and all 
morality presupposes a religion as its foundation." 23 
The maintenance of some kind of standard is unavoidable. Religion 
is not the end of all rational inquiry--the convenient deus ex machina 
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designed to squelch further argument by appealing to a higher court--but 
the beginning of it. One religious viewpoint or another will set the 
terms of debate. Greg Bahnsen believes, for example, that the 
epistemologically self-conscious Christian--what Bahnsen here refers to 
as a "presuppositionalist"--"must challenge the would-be autonomous man 
with the fact that only upon the presupposition of God and His 
revelation can intelligibility be preserved in his effort to understand 
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and interpret the world.'' Accordingly, the effort to understand and 
interpret the world is fundamentally religious. The practical 
consequence is simply this: any system of law or morality will tend to 
either reinforce or contradict a given religion. In America, the 
religion in question is predominantly Christian. 
Assuming that law is an establishment of religion, it is proper to 
ask: what set of religious presuppositions is embodied in the 
Constitution or--even more fundamentally--in western culture? M. 
Stanton Evans restates what is often obvious only to outside observers 
and adherents of other religions: it is biblical theism that underlies 
the constitutional tradition. 
Even on a brief recapitulation, it should be evident that we have 
derived a host of political and social values from our religious 
heritage: Personal freedom and individualism, limited 
government-constitutionalism and the order-keeping state, the 
balance and division of powers, separation of church and state, 
federalism and local autonomy, government by consent and 
representative institutions, bills of rights and privileges. Add 
to these the development of Western science, the notion of progress 
over linear time, egalitarianism and the like, and it is apparent 
that the array of ideas and attitudes that we think of as 
characteristically secular and liberal are actually by-products of 
our religion. It may be said, indeed, that the characteristic 
feature of liberalism, broadly defined--classical as well as 
modern--has been an attempt to take these by-products, sever them 
from their theological origins, and make them independent and 
self-validating. On the whole, it has not been a successful 
. t 25 experlmen . 
Biblical theism desacralizes--or secularizes--the natural order. 
Some religions begin with a multitude of fickle deities that man must 
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propitiate or attempt to control through iconic or symbolic magic. The 
Bible begins with one transcendent God who creates the world and places 
man within it as his steward. Liberty is possible because all creation 
is governed by God's law. Otherwise, there is no security short of 
total control and politics becomes a matter of conquest rather than 
consensus. 
While the assumptions behind American constitutional law are 
secular in their expression, many--if not most--of their guiding 
principles are derived primarily or secondarily from biblical religion. 
The absence of an express statement of religious purpose or even an 
acknowledgment of divine blessings has been the subject of controversy 
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over whether the Constitution is a "secular" or "godless" document. 
While the religious references it does contain are too oblique to 
satisfy critics who lament its "political atheism," 27 other critics are 
equally offended by any expression of public religiosity, regarding it 
as "religious treason" or as "an establishment of religion." 28 But the 
earlier colonial charters and state constitutions were similarly guided 
by practical considerations and were likewise sparing in their religious 
references. The customary invocation of divine favor or acknowledgment 
of God's blessings, usually found in the preambles of state 
constitutions, is generally a later development inspired by the New 
England convenants. 
But the argument from silence is not a very satisfactory approach 
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to the question. The Articles of Confederation and the Constitution are 
l 'l t b t th t. f . t 29 a so Sl en a ou e ques lon o soverelgn y. The issues which 
prompted the calling of the Philadelphia Convention related to the 
strengthening of an already existing "perpetual Union" rather than the 
creation of an altogether new political system. The assumption that the 
founders radically departed from ea~lier principles and precedents is 
unnecessary, particularly considering the attention they paid to the 
rule of law and the limitation of power. It is more logical to assume a 
continuity of purpose. 
With the exception of an incidental mention of religion and a brief 
reference to "the Great Governor of the world," the Articles were 
similarly silent on the subject of religion. Yet the retention by the 
states of "every power, jurisdiction and right" not "expressly delegated 
to the United States" did not prevent Congress from exercising its 
customary religious functions. Congress issued proclamations of fast 
days and thanksgivings. It employed chaplains, directed the importation 
of Bibles from Europe in 1777, and endorsed the publication of the first 
American edition of the Bible in 1782. 30 If, as Leo Pfeffer maintains, 
the political leaders of this period worked from an assumed consensus of 
opinion in support of Christianity, there is little reason to suppose 
this assumption suddenly changed in 1787. In fact, Robert Cord has 
challenged Pfeffer's separationist hypothesis regarding the religion 
clauses of the Constitution, claiming that the facts "prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that no 'high and impregnable' wall between Church and 
State was in historical fact erected by the First Amendment nor was one 
31 intended by the Framers of that Amendment." Cord notes that the new 
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Congress continued to employ chaplains and even provided direct aid to 
religion, sometimes in fulfillment of treaty obligations. The first 
four Presidents except Jefferson proclaimed days of public thanksgiving 
and prayer. Sunday continued to be observed as a day of rest. 32 
The Religion Clauses 
The religion clauses did not make any substantive changes in 
earlier practice, except to prohibit religious tests for national 
office. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina first brought up the matter 
by proposing that the "legislature of the United States shall pass no 
law on the subject of religion."33 Edmund Randolph's resolutions of 
June 19, 1787 provided for an oath of office. One month later, the oath 
clause was unanimously adopted. When Article VI came up for a final 
vote at the end of August, the oath clause was modified by adding the 
words "or affirmation" after "oath" and Charles Pinckney moved that a 
clause prohibiting religious tests be added. Given the religious 
implications of oath taking, the clause may have been regarded as a 
precaution against a national church establishment. It was adopted 
unanimously and placed immediately following the oath clause, even 
though Roger Sherman replied that he "thought it unnecessary." 34 
The meaning of the Constitution or the intent of its framers has 
been the central issue in this century in regard to properly 
accommodating the spheres of church and state. The prevailing view of 
the condition of American religion at the time of the founding is that 
Christian orthodoxy was losing its hold and that the beliefs of the 
founders reflected the heterodoxy of the Enlightenment. This 
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interpretation is equally prevalent among evangelical scholars. Edwin 
Gaustad writes: 
Pietist groups . . . vigorously condemned on principle any linkage 
between the civil and ecclesiastical realm; religion was personal, 
not political, and the redeemed Christian community was called to 
live in separation from the world, not in corrupting alliance with 
it. Then the founding fathers themselves, largely deist in their 
orientation and sympathy, saw the politically powerful church as a 
liability for the state and a35hackle on those struggling to 
advance the cause of mankind. 
American culture undoubtedly had already begun to show signs of the 
pluralism that has characterized it ever since. But too much has been 
made of the impact of deism and rationalism in shaping our political 
institutions. John Warwick Montgomery, for instance, acknowledges that 
"in spite of the Deistic flavor of terminology in our founding 
documents, these documents actually convey a view of government which 
. . t f th t b . b. bl" l . . l n 36 glves expresslon o some o e mos aslc l lca prlnclp es. 
Although English deism--which is often confused with natural 
theology--gave birth to radical biblical criticism and influenced the 
continental Enlightenment, its concept of an absentee god found few 
worshipers in America. Indeed, neither the anticlericalism of European 
rationalists nor the messianic conception of the state took root at this 
time. Open freethinkers like Thomas Paine found little favor. Others 
who held heterodox opinions, like Jefferson and Franklin, were actually 
quite ambivalent in their religious views and cautious about expressing 
them. Even then, they continued to draw on the intellectual capital of 
37 their orthodox countrymen. 
Despite regional and ecclesiastical differences, the American 
culture was united by its common roots in the dissenting tradition and a 
general preference for local institutions as opposed to concentrations 
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of political and religious power. The secularization of politics did 
not mean either hostility or indifference to religion but probably 
reflected a laissez faire attitude that church and state were most 
secure when left free to find their own equilibrium. In fact, the 
religious views of most members of the Convention were fairly orthodox, 
as M. E. Bradford--among others--has noted: 
Approximately thirty of the Philadelphia Framers were greatly 
involved with the growth and administration of their own particular 
denomination. A few were zealous proselytizers. Another twenty 
were conventional Christians, in most cases conforming to an 
inherited faith. Concerning John Rutledge and George Wythe and 
even Madison, there were rumors of Deism; but these were probably 
politically motivated calumnies, with all the evidence pointing to 
the contrary. Hugh Williamson was a very heterodox Presbyterian 
who speculated about "unfallen men" who lived on comets, and James 
Wilson was a nominal Anglican who was probably a freethinker in the 
privacy of his study. Others were "broad" churchmen who in the 
effort to practice tolerance adopted the kind of periphrasis in 
speaking of God which the Deists had made fashionable: they avoided 
the terms of reverence provided by Holy Scripture and spoke instead 
of the "Author of our being" or the "Great Architect." They were 
no more genuine skeptics than they were dem~§rats, as was often 
made clear in their private correspondence. 
The Ratification Debates 
At the time of the Convention, religious tests were required in all 
the states except Rhode Island. The provision of the Constitution that 
prohibited their use for national office stirred controversy at several 
state ratifying conventions. The debates clearly show that the meaning 
of this clause was subject to a diversity of interpretations. 
But it was the absence of a bill of rights that grew into the major 
point of contention in several states and brought the religious issue 
into sharper focus. Patrick Henry, for example, recited numerous 
objections to the Constitution, including the absence of specific 
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safeguards to ensure religious liberty. Edmund Randolph replied that 
the "variety of sects ... is the best security for the freedom of 
religion."39 Madison declared there was "not a shadow of right in the 
general government to intermeddle with religion.'' 40 Oliver Wolcott of 
Connecticut answered critics that the oath itself was "a direct appeal 
to that God who is the avenger of perjury. Such an appeal to him is a 
full acknowledgment of his being and providence. 1141 
Henry Abbot of North Carolina, however, summarized the objections 
that were then being raised. These ranged from a fear of infringements 
on religious liberty--particularly through the treaty-making power--to 
the possibility that "pagans, deists, and Mahometans might obtain 
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offices among us" if religious tests were barred. James Iredell 
replied that religious tests were the cause of persecution and an 
invitation to hypocrisy. "Had Congress undertaken to guaranty religious 
freedom, or any particular species of it," he claimed, "they would then 
have had a pretence to interfere in a subject they have nothing to do 
"th 1143 Wl • Thus the debates revealed a general desire to preserve the 
influence of Christianity and protect religious liberty, but also 
disagreements about the appropriate means to use. 
Delegates who sought a bill of rights succeeded in stipulating that 
the new government would attend to this matter after Congress met. In 
addition, North Carolina proposed twenty amendments, including one 
modeled after the popular Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776. This 
guarantee had already been adopted by North Carolina and other states: 
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the 
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and 
conviction, not by force or violence, and, therefore, all men have 
an equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free exercise of 
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relgion, according to the dictates of conscience; and that no 
particular religious sect or society ought 4~ be favored or 
established by law in preference to others. 
The original wording of the final clause of this article, which was 
drafted by George Mason and amended by James Madison, read: "and that it 
is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forebearance, love, and 
charity towards each other." 45 
The Bill of Rights 
When the First Congress met in 1789, James Madison introduced the 
Bill of Rights proposal on June 8th, three months after the opening of 
the session. Roger Sherman, the author of the compromise plan that 
ultimately prevailed at the Constitutional Convention, urged that the 
important business at hand not be interrupted and suggested allowing 
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sufficient time to test the Constitution before recommending changes. 
M. E. Bradford believes Sherman was concerned lest the enumeration of 
individual rights or limitations upon federal authority lead to the loss 
of rights about which the Constitution is silent and that a "Federal 
authority to define and guarantee human rights would result in a power 
of oversight concerning questions related to the internal order of the 
47 
states." But the Bill of Rights soon became the main order of 
business. 
The wording of Madison's original proposal indicates a close 
conjunction between the issues of "establishment" and what was 
subsequently called the "free exercise of religion:" 
Fourthly, That in article I., section 9, between clauses 3 and 4, 
be inserted these clauses, to wit: The civil rights of none shall 
be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall 
any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal 
rights of ~§nscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, 
infringed. 
The wording was changed in committee to read: "No religion shall be 
established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be 
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infringed." On August 15, the House went into a Committee of the Whole 
to debate this version of the amendment. Peter Sylvester of New York 
"feared it might be thought to have a tendency to abolish religion 
altogether." Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts wanted the wording changed 
to read: "no religious doctrine shall be established by law." Roger 
Sherman again declared that he "thought the amendment altogether 
unnecessary, inasmuch as Congress had no authority to make religious 
establishments." James Madison said that he interpreted the language to 
mean "that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the 
legal observance of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any 
manner contrary to their conscience." But he also reiterated a common 
concern expressed during the ratification debates that the "necessary 
and proper" clause of Article I, section 8 could be used to "infringe 
the rights of conscience, and establish a national religion." 49 
The tenor of the debate and the wording of Madison's remarks 
warrant careful attention. Michael Malbin maintains that Madison's 
speech supports a hypothesis that the "establishment" clause of the 
First Amendment--even in its final version--was not intended to "require 
strict neutrality between religion and irreligion."50 The debate 
centered instead on the issue of a national church. 
Madison's response to Sherman in this speech is obvious and on the 
surface: whether the amendment really was needed or not--he 
privately agreed that it was not--some states wanted it. But there 
is another interesting aspect of this speech. In two places 
Madison misquotes his own proposal, adding a word to it by saying 
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that Congress should not establish a religion. The additional word 
is significant. If it had been in the original, Sylvester would 
never have objected. If the added word had been in Madison's 
clause, it could not have been read as a prohibition of indirect, 
nondiscriminatory assistance to religion. To say that Congress 
should not establish~ r5tigion differs from saying it should not 
assist religion as such. 
Malbin elsewhere weakens his case, however, by basing it--like Pfeffer's 
separationist hypothesis--on the assumption that the Constitution 
authorizes Congress either to promote or restrict religion unless 
prevented by specific prohibitions. It is evident from these debates 
that the threat of national intervention in religious affairs--whether 
of a positive or a negative nature--was the foremost concern of both 
those who supported the amendment and those who, like Sherman, opposed 
it. In any case, the amendment neither added to nor subtracted from any 
existing power of Congress. 
Benjamin Huntington of Rhode Island agreed with Madison's view but 
repeated Sylvester's concern that the amendment might be "extremely 
hurtful to the cause of religion" by observing that "others might find 
it convenient to put another construction on it." Moreover, in case of 
lawsuits growing out of internal church disputes, the federal courts 
might be unable to enforce contracts according to the by-laws of the. 
religious societies. Citing the Rhode Island charter as a model of 
religious liberty, Huntington "hoped . . the amendment would be made 
in such a way as to secure the rights of conscience, and a free exercise 
of the rights of religion, but not to patronize those who professed no 
religion at all. n 52 
Madison replied that he "thought if the word national was 
introduced, it would point the amendment directly to the object it was 
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intended to prevent.'' But it appears that Madison misjudged the effects 
of his remarks. Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire objected to Madison's 
proposed rewording and offered a different proposal: "Congress shall 
make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience." 
Elbridge Gerry objected to the implication that a national as opposed to 
a federal government had been created. After Madison withdrew his 
motion, Livermore's proposal was passed by 31-20. 53 Malbin believes 
that the new wording would have prohibited any form of federal aid to 
religion while, at the same time, enhancing state power. This, he 
suggests, could have "raised havoc with the powers of the new federal 
government. It was precisely for this reason that Gerry, ever watchful 
of the ne1.v government's power, supported Livermore."54 But Malbin gives 
no reason to assume that Livermore meant to do anything more than 
prevent a nationalist reading of the amendment. 
On August 20, Fisher Ames of Massachusetts proposed returning the 
amendment to committee and changing the language to read: "Congress 
shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise 
thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience." While there is no 
record of a floor debate, this is the version that was sent to the 
Senate. 55 
Several substitute versions were offered in the Senate but the 
floor debates and even the vote counts were kept off the record. The 
Senate quickly defeated two motions that prohibited any official 
preference for one religion over another. The last clause of the Ames 
version was deleted following a vote and, finally, the language was 
severely narrowed to read: "Congress shall make no law establishing 
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articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise 
of religion." The amendment was then sent back to the House after the 
Senate defeated a separate proposal to prevent the states from 
infringing on the rights of conscience. Meanwhile in the House, an 
attempt to introduce into the Second Amendment a clause exempting 
conscientious objectors from militia duty--another issue with 
nationalist implications--had also been defeated. A conference 
committee, which included Madison and Sherman among its members, worked 
out the final wording for the First Amendment religion clause: "Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 56 
Implications 
The record is fully consistent with a narrow construction of the 
role of the general government in religion. No positive grant of power 
in this area was recognized. A separation of church and state was not 
required except where legislation might tend toward an establishment of 
religion, as would be the case with direct aid. Philip Kurland has 
observed: 
From this legislative history of the religion clauses, a few 
propositions can be derived that should be beyond debate. First, 
the restraints, whatever they were, were to be restraints only on 
the United States. The states had not forfeited, by the 
promulgation of the amendment, any of their rights to establish a 
state religion or to afford preferences to one religious sect over 
others. Second, the national government could not establish a 
state religion or afford privileges to any religious group or 
impose disabilities on any individual on the basis of religious 
preference or affiliation. Or, in sum, religion was to be no 
business of the national government. 
A third proposition emerges from the legislative history of the 
religion clauses, I think, and that is that they were not separate 
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and distinct conceptions, but rather a unified one. The existence 
of an established church implied intolerance for the nonestablished 
religions. The ban on a national church monopoly would. 57 factionalize the churches and thereby assure religious freedom. 
Kurland's sweeping statement that "religion was to be no business 
of the national government" may be disregarded without diminishing the 
importance of his argument that the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment are "not separate and distinct conceptions." While the 
so-called wall of separation between church and state has never been 
solid, attempts to seal it against all aid to religion has provoked a 
new iconoclastic controversy. The Supreme Court's artificial separation 
of the establishment and free exercise clauses frequently pits them 
against each other. The word "religion" consequently has been degraded 
into a dualistic, split-level concept in which belief is divorced from 
practice. This allows religion to be treated merely as a system of 
belief--its definition being broadened or narrowed whenever 
convenient--while its unimpeded practice is severed from the 
constitutionally protected area of free exercise values. What the 
Supreme Court includes in the category of religion in such free exercise 
cases as Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961 ), or Welsh v. United 
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), is sometimes effectively narrowed to one 
religious tradition in a case like Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972) and altogether ignored in various establishment clause cases. 58 
The result may be much the same as Philip Kurland's third proposition: 
to "factionalize the churches." 
Since the Court has taken upon itself the task of arbitrating the 
various political and religious interpretations of the Constitution, a 
large share of the responsibility for the tangled state of current law 
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and precedent on religion must be attributed to its decisions and, at 
times, indecision. In some respects, a constitutional revolution has 
taken place within the last four or five decades. 59 Yet, with the 
exception of the Fourteenth Amendment, nothing has been added to the 
Constitution since the Bill of Rights that can account for the 
significantly altered place of religion in public life today. 
Tax-subsidized schools are being purged of traditional religious 
activities which, in turn, are often replaced by new varieties of 
religiosity. 
One proponent of this development, Conrad Moehlman, has stated the 
case for a "common faith" such as John De~;vey advocated: 
Religion has never left the public-school classroom. It has only 
been adjusted to the new synthesis which is replacing the medieval 
synthesis--the synthesis of science, democracy, and ethically 
evaluated religion. A sectarian public school can exist only in a 
sectarian society. American mores were sectarian during much of 
the nineteenth century but during the last half-century have been 
casting out sectarianism. . . . Children are entitled to a 
religion which is simple and understandable, and such an 
interpretation has always been in the curriculum of the common 
school. What other public institution in history has g0en founded 
on the principle of "the brotherhood of man as he is?" 
But this unambiguously religious sentiment seems tame by comparison with 
current examples of values education mandated for the public school 
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classroom. Private church-affiliated schools and home schools are 
similarly facing bureaucratic intervention in the form of detailed 
curriculum requirements, mandatory certification of teachers, and other 
requirements that often tread a fine line between legitimate oversight 
and harassment. Tax exemptions, loans, corporation laws, and 
grants-in-aid may serve as effective conduits for regulation. 
In order to evaluate these developments, it is appropriate to first 
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examine a few of the earlier authorities, interpretations, and 
precedents that have helped shape the current state of religion in the 
republic. 
Interpretations 
Many of the early commentators on the voluntary principle in 
religion took pains to emphasize that no slight to religion was 
intended. The idea of loosening churches from dependence on the state 
treasury was as novel as the penitentiary system that drew interested 
European visitors like Alexis de Tocqueville, and it similarly drew 
comment. Francis Grund, who immigrated from Bohemia, wrote that 
Americans look upon religion as a promoter of civil and political 
liberty; and have, therefore, transferred to it a large portion of 
the affection which they cherish from the institutions of their 
country. In other countries, where religion has become the 
instrument of oppression, it has been the policy of the liberal 
party to diminish its influencgl but in America its promotion is 
essential to the Constitution. 
If the institutional separation of church and state had developed 
purely for reasons of state, the character of the American religious 
tradition might have followed a very different line of development. For 
instance, the Spanish colonies were governed by a union of church and 
state. Clergymen were licensed and the government was authorized to 
elect bishops and other ecclesiastics. Thus lay investiture persisted. 
William Torpey notes that secular control was similarly dominant in the 
French colonies "and religious freedom strikingly lacking."63 The 
disestablishment of the Roman Catholic Church in France, when it finally 
came during the French Revolution, was accompanied by violent 
anticlericalism and was followed by the creation of a highly 
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syncretistic civil religion. 
Although there were strong fears of similar Jacobin violence in 
America during this period, the disestablishment of churches proceeded 
rather peacefully. The immediate effect of disestablishment, as Lyman 
Beecher and others saw it, was to strengthen the character and prestige 
64 
of the churches themselves. 
The nineteenth century opened with a period of religious revival 
known as the Second Great Awakening, which centered in the "burned-over 
district" of western New York. Voluntary societies flourished: home 
missions, foreign missions, the grammar school movement, the Sunday 
school movement, Bible and tract societies, and various charitable 
associations. Religious liberals took the lead on such social reform 
issues as abolition, temperance, women's rights, prison discipline, and 
public education. But as Ann Douglas has shown, "an anti-intellectual 
sentimentalism'' gained the upper hand in religious and cultural circles, 
providing a vehicle through which clergymen and women were able to win 
greater social status and preserve some traditional cultural values 
while avoiding the responsibility of a comprehensive program. One 
result was a tendency to redefine and subvert old doctrines without 
facing up to the consequent loss of center. Douglas concluded: 
The triumph of the "feminizing," sentimental forces that would 
generate mass culture redefined and perhaps limited the 
possibilities for change in American society. Sentimentalism, with 
its tendency to obfuscate the visible dynamics of development, 
heralded the cultura~5 sprawl that has increasingly characterized post-Victorian life. 
These moral crusades spilled over into all areas of life and 
paralleled the early efforts by physicians to establish medicine as a 
state-authorized, self-regulating profession. Medical societies sought 
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the power of licensure and fee scheduling, setting an example for other 
vocational associations. But following the Civil War, it was 
increasingly the idea of professionalism that provided the banner 
underneath which the social reform movement could spread and consolidate 
its gains. 66 The evangelical influence began to wane. 
While various commentators disagreed--it is a disagreement that 
persists--as to the nature and quality of the religion during this 
period, they could not discount its impact. Alexis de Tocqueville 
detected vitality and a centrifugal tendency he considered pantheistic, 
concluding: 
Religion in America takes no direct part in the government of 
society, but it must be regarded as the first of their political 
institutions; for if it does not impart a taste for freedom, it 
facilitates the use of it. • . I do not know whether all 
Americans have a sincere faith in their religion--for who can 
search the human heart?--but I am certain that they hold it 59 be 
indispensable to the maintenance of republican institutions. 
But Rev. Robert Baird, an American who addressed himself to Europeans, 
heartily disagreed with Tocqueville's notion that religion in America 
"reigns there much less as a doctrine of revelation than as a commonly 
admitted opinion" and that it was composed of "a multitude of ready-made 
opinions" dictated by a tyranny of the majority. 68 
M. de Tocqueville does not forget that religion gave birth to 
Anglo-American society, but he does forget for the moment what sort 
of religion it was; that it was not a religion that repels 
investigation, or that would have men receive any thing as truth, 
where such momentous concerns are involved, upon mere trust in 
public opinion. Such has never been the char~§ter of 
Protestantism, rightly so called, in any age. 
Constitutional Commentators 
The religious underpinnings of American political and legal 
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institutions have been duly noted by legal scholars, historians, judges, 
politicians, and clergymen alike. Church polities provided models not 
only for colonial civil governments but also for the present 
constitutional system. R. Kemp Morton summarized some of these 
influences from a Presbyterian standpoint: 
Presbyterians had a more republican system; each congregation was 
independent of every other congregation in its purely local 
affairs, but the presbyteries and synods of pre-Revolutionary times 
exhibited a pattern for a union in a central organization without 
any loss of fundamental rights. It was from this church structure 
that the formula co-ordinating the large and the small states into 
one union came. The College of Cardinals of the Catholic Church 
formed the pattern for the Electoral College for electing the 
President and the Vice-President. The persistent pursuit of 
religious freedom by these and other dissenting sects had taught 
their vo75ries the philosophy of both religious and civil 
liberty. 
Other writers have detected Congregationalist, Baptist, Episcopalian, 
and Jewish contributions to the constitutional framework. 71 
Justice Joseph Story and Chancellor James Kent were among many 
sitting judges during the nineteenth century who cited the maxim that 
"Christianity is part of the common lavJ." As early as 1764, however, 
Thomas Jefferson attributed the phrase to a misinterpretation made by 
Sir Henry Finch in 1613 that had subsequently been perpetuated by 
Matthew Hale and William Blackstone. But Justice Story disputed 
Jefferson's contention that it was a "judicial forgery" and quoted the 
opinion of Chief Justice Prisot of the Court of Common Pleas which 
established the precedent in 1458: 
As to those laws, which those of holy church have in ancient 
scripture, it behooves us to give them credence, for this is common 
law, upon which all manner of laws are founded; and thus, sir, we 
are obliged to take notice of their law of holy c~~rch; and it 
seems they are obliged to take notice of our law. 
James McClellan has noted, moreover, that Justice Story was not 
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satisfied simply to base his contention on a single precedent but 
attempted to prove that the maxim was a general principle of common law. 
The Presbyterian theologian, Charles Hodge, carried the higher law 
argument to its ccnclusion: "Whatever Protestant Christianity forbids, 
the law of the land (within its sphere, i.e., within the sphere in which 
civil authority may appropriately act) forbids." 73 By implication, 
then, anything contrary to the law of "ancient scripture" would violate 
the common law and the Constitution. 74 
Mark DeWolfe Howe suggests that Thomas Jefferson "had always been 
uncomfortably aware of the closeness of the affiliation between 
Christianity and the common law" and "saw the transmitting of the maxim 
from English to American shores as the transplanting of the seeds of 
establishment."75 The idea that the common law established Christianity 
remained an important political issue because of the persistence of 
church establishments in several states. In fact, at the time the 
Constitution was adopted, five states still maintained formal 
denominational establishments while others like Massachusetts adopted 
Protestantism or showed preference to Christianity. Only Virginia and 
Rhode Island guaranteed full religious liberty. 76 In all, ten of the 
fourteen states effectively established Protestantism; all favored 
Christianity in some manner. 77 Justice Story, a Unitarian, abhorred 
ecclesiastical establishments but believed Christianity to be the 
foundation of social order in America: 
Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and of 
the amendment to it ... , the general, if not the universal, 
sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive 
encouragement from the state, so far as was not incompatible with 
the private rights of conscience and the freedom of religious 
worship. An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a 
matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would 
have created universal disapprobation, if not universal 
indignation. 
224 
It yet remains a problem to be solved in human affairs, whether any 
free government can be permanent where the public worship of God, 
and the support of religion, constitute no7gart of the policy or duty of the state in any assignable shape. 
He agreed with the sentiment that religion should be encouraged by the 
state but not through compulsion and not by showing sectarian 
preferences: 
The real object of the amendment was, not to countenance, much less 
to advance Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating 
Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and 
to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should 
give to an ~~erarchy the exclusive patronage of the national 
government. 
He concluded that, because liberty of conscience is protected and power 
over religion is left to the state governments, "the Protestant, the 
Calvinist and the Arminian, the Jew and the Infidel, may sit down at the 
common table of the national councils, without any inquisition into 
their faith, or mode of worship."80 
Justice Story did not try to make a distinction between the 
establishment and free exercise clauses. His interpretation, moveover, 
was echoed by other commentators, such as James Bayard and William 
Rawle, both of whom noted the evils growing out of the union of church 
and state. Both also believed religious liberty enabled religion to 
flourish in greater purity and vigor. 81 Chancellor James Kent of Nevv 
York indicated that he found no real difference between the federal and 
state constitutions in regard to religious liberty, except in seven 
states that still retained religious tests at the time he wrote. He 
regarded religious liberty as an absolute right and believed it went 
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hand in hand with civil liberty. 82 Nevertheless, during the 1821 
convention to revise the state constitution, he joined with Vice 
President Daniel Tompkins, Chief Justice Spencer of the New York Supreme 
Court, and Rufus King in defending the recognition of Christianity as 
part of the common law and helped turn aside a proposed amendment that 
"no particular religion shall ever be declared or adjudged to be the law 
of the land. n 83 
Near the end of the nineteenth century, Thomas M. Cooley, who 
publicly opposed Sunday closing laws, strongly reaffirmed the same 
judicial precepts held by Justice Story and Chancellor Kent: 
By establishment of religion is meant the setting up or recognition 
of a state church, or at least the conferring upon one church of 
special favors and advantages which are denied to others. It was 
never intended by the Constitution that the government should be 
prohibited from recognizing religion, or that religious worship 
should never be provided for in cases where a proper recognition of 
Divine Providence in the working of government might seem to 
require it, and where it might be done without drawing any 
invidious distinctions between different religious beliefs, 
organizations, or sects. The Christian religion was always 
recognized in the administration of the common law; and so far as 
that law continues to be the law of the land, the fundamental 
principles of that religion must continue to b§4recognized in the 
same cases and to the same extent as formerly. 
In a letter he sent to Robert Baird, Henry Wheaton, who then served 
as an ambassador to the court of Berlin, described a few of the ways 
Christianity continued to be recognized, encouraged, and protected back 
home. His examples included laws governing sabbaths, church property, 
blasphemy, oath taking, and marriage, all of which helped illustrate his 
point that the church was not viewed as a rival or enemy of the state 
but as a "co-worker in the religious and moral instruction of the 
85 people." 
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State Courts 
The extent to which early American law actually incorporated the 
common law of England is disputed. But Blackstone's commentaries on the 
common law, which asserted that Christianity is part of the law of the 
land, exercised a profound influence on the generation that fought the 
War for Independence. Edmund Burke testified to their popularity when 
he remarked: "I hear that they have sold nearly as many of Blackstone's 
86 Commentaries in America as in England." Although Blackstone's 
analysis of offenses against God and religion assumed the existence of 
an Anglican establishment, he emphasized that revelation is the source 
of all valid laws and obligations: 
This law of nature being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God 
himself, is of course superior in obligations to any other. It is 
binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no 
human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of 
them as are valid derive all their force, and8~11 their authority, 
mediately or immediately, from this original. 
This belief that American common law incorporated higher law 
generally and Christianity specifically persisted well into the present 
century. For example, the first volume of American Ruling Cases (1912) 
cited a Ne\-J York decision upholding a Sunday closing law as a governing 
precedent. In Lindenmuller v. People, 33 Barb. (N.Y.) 548 (1861 ), the 
New York Supreme Court based its decision, in part, on the incorporation 
of English common law: 
The common law, as it was in force on the 20th day of April, 1777, 
subject to such alterations as have been made, from time to time, 
by the legislature, and except such parts of it as are repugnant to 
the constitution, is, and ever has been, a part of the law of the 
state (33 Barb. 548, 561; 1 A.R.C. 457). 
As in similar cases elsewhere, the Court took care to qualify its 
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acknowledgment of Christianity as part of the common law so as not to 
imply any establishment of religion, which would make Christianity a 
civil or political institution. It declared that even though 
Christianity is not the legal religion of the state, "this is not 
inconsistent with the idea that it is, and ever has been, the religion 
of the people." 
As in England, the maxim was most frequently cited in blasphemy 
cases. In Updegraph v. The Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394, 401 (1824), 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quoted Lord Mansfield: 
There never was a single instance, from the Saxon times down to our 
own, in which a man was punished for erroneous oplnlons. For 
atheism, blasphemy, and reviling the Christian religion, there have 
been instances of prosecution at the common law; but bare 
nonconformity is no sin by the common law, and all pains and 
penalties for nonconformity to the established rites and modes are 
repealed by the acts of toleration, and dissenters exempted from 
ecclesiastical censures. What bloodshed and confusion have been 
occasioned, from the reign of Henry IV., when the first penal 
statutes were enacted, down to the revolution, by laws made to 
force conscience. There is certainly nothing more unreasonable, 
nor inconsistent with the rights of human nature, more contrary to 
the spirit and precepts of the Christian religion, more iniquitous 
and unjust, more impolitic, than persecution @§ainst natural 
religion, revealed religion and sound policy. 
The Court indicated that the only interest of temporal courts is to 
prevent disturbances of the public peace "likely to proceed from the 
removal of religious and moral restraints; this is the ground of 
punishment for blasphemous and criminal publications; and without any 
view to spiritual correction of the offender" (11 S. & R. 394, 404). At 
405, it added: 
Chief Justice Swift, in his System of Laws, 2 vol. 825, has some 
very just reasoning on the subject. He observes, "To prohibit the 
open, public, and explicit denial of the popular religion of a 
country, is a necessary measure to preserve the tranquillity of a 
government. Of this, no person in a Christian country can 
complain; for, admitting him to be an infidel, he must acknowledge 
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that no benefit can be derived from the subversion of a religion 
which enforces the purest morality." In the Supreme Court of New 
York it was solemnly determined, that Christianity was part of the 
law of the land, and that to revile the Holy Scriptures was an 
indictable offence. The case assumes, says Chief Justice Kent, 
that we are a Christian people, and the morality of the country is 
deeply engrafted on Christianity. Nor are we bound by any 
expression in the constitution, as some have strangely supposed, 
not to punish at all, or to punish indiscriminately the like attack 
upon Mahomet or the Grand Lama. The People v. Ruggles, 8 Johnston, 
290. 
Although the Supreme Court of Delaware also upheld a blasphemy 
conviction in State v. Chandler, 2 Harrington 553 (1837), Chief Justice 
J. M. Clayton similarly made it clear that it was due to a lack of 
jurisdiction over spiritual offenses, not to a minimizing of their 
seriousness, that the common law did not punish the violation of every 
precept of Christianity: 
When human justice is rightly administered according to our common 
law and our constitution, it refuses all jurisdiction over crimes 
against God, unless they are by necessary consequence crimes 
against civil society, and known and defined as such by the law of 
man. It assumes that for sin against our Creator, vengeance is his 
and he will repay (2 Harrington 553, 571 ). 
The identification of Christianity with the common law was rejected 
by the Ohio Supreme Court but its reasons are instructive. In Bloom v. 
Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387, 390 (1853), Chief Justice Allen Thurman 
affirmed the validity of a Sunday contract despite a statute prohibiting 
Sunday labor and remarked that "neither Christianity, nor any other 
system of religion, is a part of the law of this State." Even so, his 
reasoning was not inconsistent with that of the Pennsylvania and New 
York opinions: 
We have no union of church and State, nor has our government ever 
been vested with authority to enforce any religious observance, 
simply because it is religious. Of course, it is no objection, 
but, on the contrary, is a high recommendation, to a legislative 
enactment, based upon justice or public policy, that it is found to 
coincide with the precepts of a true religion; but the fact is 
nevertheless true, that the power to make the law rests in the 
legislative control over things temporal and not over things 
spiritual. Thus the statute upon which the defendant relies, 
prohibiting common labor on the Sabbath, could not stand for a 
moment as a law of this State, if its sole foundation was the 
Christian duty of keeping that day holy, and its sole motive to 
enforce the observance of that duty. For no power over things 
merely spiritual, has s~er been delegated to the government ... 
(2 Ohio St. 387, 391 ). 
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The Court cited Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Barr 312 (1848), in which the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated at 323 that, despite the fixing of 
Sunday as the day of rest, the statute in question "is still, 
essentially, but a civil regulation made for the government of man as a 
member of civil society. " It also determined that those states 
which forbade secular business on Sunday did so through additional 
statutory provisions. Later, in McGatrick v. Wason, 4 Ohio St. 566 
(1855), a case involving a freight loading accident on a Sunday, the 
Court held that the shipping of freight fit into the exempt category of 
"works of necessity or charity" and sustained a judgment for the injured 
dockworker against his employer. 
In Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 
(1872), the Ohio Supreme Court upheld--although it did not require--a 
prohibition on religious instruction by the Cincinnati Board of 
Education. In a lengthy opinion, Judge John Welch commented that "Legal 
Christianity is a solecism, a contradiction of terms" (23 Ohio St. 211, 
248). He continued: 
If Christianity is a law of the state, like every other law, it 
must have a sanction.--xdequate penalties must be provided to 
enforce obedience to all its requirements and precepts. No one 
seriously contends for any such doctrine in this country, or, I 
might almost say, in this age of the world. The only 
foundation--rather, the only excuse--for the proposition, that 
Christianity is part of the law of Enis country, is the fact that 
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it is a Christian country, and that its constitutions and laws are 
made by a Christian people. And is not the very fact that those 
laws do not attempt to enforce Christianity, or to place it upon 
exceptional or vantage ground, itself a strong evidence that they 
are the laws of a Christian people, and that their religion is the 
best and purest of religions? It is strong evidence that their 
religion is indeed a religion "without partiality," ~Bd therefore a 
religion without "hypocrisy" ( 23 Ohio St. 211 , 249). 
Such cases as these, which involved blasphemy, Sunday laws, Bible 
reading in schools, and other clearly religious issues, are illustrative 
of the depth and detail of the judicial acquaintance with Christian 
precepts. At the same time, however, each of these cases raised 
difficult constitutional issues that challenged the ingenuity and logic 
of the judges. Many of these and later cases mark the trail by which 
constitutional innovations were introduced. Sunday laws, for example, 
were usually defended as public health measures and upheld by the courts 
as a legitimate exercise of the police power. Similarly, in Donahoe v. 
Richards, 38 Me. 376 (1854), the Supreme Court of Maine cited the maxim 
"salus populi suprema lex" in defense of a compulsory Bible reading law 
that allowed the exclusion of the Douay version from the classroom. 
There is considerable reason to believe such legislation was 
tendered in good faith. But in many of these and similar cases, the 
opposite side of the issue was also argued from a clearly Christian 
commitment. Theological differences were often reflected by differences 
of constitutional interpretation. Indeed, the theological term 
"constitutional hermeneutics" was used at the time by Francis Lieber and 
other commentators. Theology was still regarded as first among the 
sciences. Moreover, judicial articulations of an explicitly Christian 
perspective on constitutional law transcended narrowly religious issues, 
challenging the current view that equates secular issues with religious 
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neutrality or irreligion. A case in point is the imaginative blending 
of legal and religious scholarship in several opinions by Samuel E. 
Perkins, who sat on the bench of the Supreme Court of Indiana from 1846 
until 1865, when a Republican slate of judges swept out all the 
incumbents, then returned in 1877 and served until his death in 1879. 
One of the finest examples of Judge Perkins' judicial writing is 
his opinion in Herman v. The State, 8 Ind. 490 (1855), a case involving 
a state law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor except by the 
state for use as a medicine or for sacramental purposes. The case was 
brought before the Court on a habeas corpus obtained by a prisoner who 
had been arrested and detained for selling liquor. In ruling the law 
unconstitutional, Judge Perkins noted that "it is not competent for the 
government to take the business from the people and monopolize it." 
Quoting Thomas Say, the political economist, he attacked the law as "an 
invasion upon the faculties of industry possessed by individuals .. II 
He then traced the history of prohibition and its association with 
governments that were paternal and absolute in character: "which had no 
written constitutions limiting their powers .. II 91 
Such governments as those described, could adopt the maxim quoted 
by counsel, that the safety of the people is the supreme law, and 
act upon it; and being severally the sole judges of what their 
safety, in the countries governed, respectively required, could 
prescribe what the people should eat and drink, what political, 
moral and religious creeds they should believe in, and punish 
heresy by burning at the stake, all for the public good. Even in 
Great Britain, esteemed to have the most liberal consitution in the 
Eastern continent, Magna Charta is not of sufficient potency to 
restrain the action of Parliament, as the judiciary do not, as a 
settled rule, bring laws to the test of its provisions. Laws are 
there overthrown only occasionally by judicial construction. But 
here, we have written constitutions which are the supreme law, 
which our legislators are sworn to support, within whose 
restrictions they must limit their action for the public welfare, 
and whose barriers they cannot overleap under any pretext of 
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supposed safety of the people; for along with our written 
constitutions, we have a judiciary whose duty it is, as the only 
means of securing to the people safety from legislative aggression, 
to annul all legislative action without the pale of those 
instruments. This duty of the judicial department in this country, 
was demonstrated by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, I 
Cranch, 137, and has since been recognized as settled American law. 
The maxim above quoted, therefore, as applied to legislative power, 
is here without meaning (8 Ind. 490, 494-495). 
Later in the opinion, he celebrated the benefits of wine and strong 
drink, quoting the Bible in their defense, then concluded: 
It thus appears, if the inspired psalmist is entitled to credit, 
that man was made to laugh as well as weep, and that these 
stimulating beverages were created by the Almighty expressly to 
promote his social hilarity and enjoyment. And for this purpose 
have the world ever used them, they have ever given, in the 
language of another passage of scripture, strong drink to him that 
was weary and wine to those of heavy heart. The first miracle 
wrought by our Savior, that at Cana of Galilee, the place where he 
dwelt in his youth, and where he met his followers, after his 
resurrection, was to supply this article to increase the 
festivities of a joyous occasion; that he used it himself is 
evident from the fact that he was called by his enemies a 
winebibber; and he paid it the distinguished honor of being the 
eternal memorial of his death and man's redemption (8 Ind. 490, 
502). 
He concluded his attack by dismissing the public health argument 
for prohibition in some of his saltiest language: 
It is based on the principle that a man shall not use at all for 
enjoyment what his neighbor may abuse, a doctrine that would, if 
enforced by law in general practice annihilate society, make 
eunuchs of all men, or drive them into the cells of the monks, and 
bring the human race to an end, or continue it under the direction 
of licensed county agents. 
Such, however, is not the principle upon which the Almighty governs 
the world. He made man a free agent, and to give him opportunity 
to exercise his will, to be virtuous or vicious as he should 
choose, he placed evil as well as good before him, he put the apple 
into the garden of Eden, and left upon man the responsibility of 
his choice, made it a moral question, and left it so. He enacted 
as to that, a moral, not a physical prohibition. He could have 
easily enacted a physical prohibitory law by declaring the fatal 
apple a nuisance and removing it. He did not. His purpose was 
otherwise, and he has since declared that the tares and wheat shall 
grow together to the end of the world. Man cannot, by prohibitory 
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law, be robbed of his free agency (8 Ind. 490, 503~504). 
In two other cases, the Indiana Supreme Court struck down 
congressional legislation it regarded as lying outside the 
constitutional jurisdication of the federal government. In Griffin v. 
Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370 (1863), the unanimous Court ruled unconstitutional 
an act of Congress that indemnified federal officers who arrested 
civilians for selling liquor to soldiers and held that neither the 
President nor Congress could suspend a writ of habeas corpus issued by a 
state court. For the purposes of this case, Judge Perkins conceded the 
government's right to exercise martial law, but only temporarily and 
locally in cases of necessity--"where the civil law is expelled"--and as 
limited by the constitution. Judge James M. Hanna wrote a forceful 
concurring opinion that conceded even less ground to the federal law. 
In Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 276 (1864), a case involving a stamp tax on 
state legal documents, Judge Perkins commented that Congress "has not a 
right, by direct or indirect means, to annihilate the functions of the 
State government" by taxing them. 
Two legal tender cases are also worthy of note. In Reynolds v. The 
Bank, 18 Ind. 467 (1862), Judge Perkins dwelt at some length on the 
absence of either a constitutional or commercial basis for declaring 
bills of credit to be legal tender, but then held that doubts about the 
constitutionality of the law must be resolved in its favor until the 
Supreme Court of the United States ruled otherwise. Judge Hanna 
dissented, arguing "that by the constitution the right is not vested in 
Congress to make a paper named a legal tender in payment of private 
debts" (18 Ind. 467, 475). Two years later, Judge Perkins spoke for a 
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unanimous Court in Thayer v. Hedges, 22 Ind. 282 (1864), a case 
involving a promissory note in which the same legal tender law was at 
issue. Reverting to the Articles of Confederation, he cataloged the 
subjects covered by the term "general welfare" and then traced the later 
development of the constitutional separation of powers between the 
general government and the states. He cited common commercial practice, 
political economists, and even biblical history as evidence of the 
unconstitutionality of the law: "Coin was the sacred currency as well as 
profane, of the ancient world. Historically considered, we find that 
the Almighty, and His Prophets and Apostles, were for a specie basis; 
that gold and silver were the theme of their constant eulogy" (22 Ind. 
282, 304). 92 
As these cases illustrate, it was not uncommon for state courts in 
the nineteenth century to give special recognition to religious 
considerations and even appeal to commonly accepted religious practices 
as a basis for judgment. This was just as true of secular cases as 
formally religious ones. Indeed, the Bible was regarded as a major 
sourcebook of constitutional theory and practice. The same courts that 
strongly asserted the value of religious liberty for all apparently did 
not perceive any contradiction when they acknowledged the special place 
of Christianity and the Bible in the life of the republic. 
The Administration and Congress 
Comparatively little attention was paid to religious issues either 
by Congress or the Administration early in the nineteenth century. The 
few exceptions do not indicate any of the profound differences that 
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began to be especially felt after the Civil War. 
The controversy over the maxim that "Christianity is part of the 
common law" was closely paralleled by another one concerning the first 
Treaty with Tripoli, which had been negotiated by Joel Barlow and signed 
by President John Adams in 1797. One version of the treaty contains a 
clause--possibly spurious--stating that the United State government "is 
not, in any sense founded upon the Christian religion." In any case, 
this wording was absent from the Treaty with Tunis of the same year and 
omitted from the second Treaty with Tripoli of 1805. 93 Moreover, a 
series of treaties with Algiers guaranteed protection for any "christian 
captives'' who boarded warships of the United States. 94 
One of the first occasions on which Congress made a declaration 
regarding a religious controversy occurred in 1829 when the Senate~-and 
later the House--responded to petitions against Sunday mail delivery by 
issuing a report upholding the principle of sabbatarian legislation but 
excepting the ban on work "in cases of absolute necessity or great 
public utility." The report noted denominational differences on the 
subject, then asserted that the "transportation of the mails on the 
first day of the week ... does not interfere with rights of 
conscience." 95 Postal workers were allowed to abstain from work on 
their particular day of rest, but this policy remained only an exception 
to the general observance of Sunday as the official day of rest. 
Then, during the 1853-1854 sessions of Congress, both houses 
responded to petitions against the practice of employing chaplains in 
the military, at Indian stations, and in Congress itself. Each house 
issued a report finding that no establishment of religion resulted from 
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the employment of chaplains. The employment of chaplains was reaffirmed 
as a means of protecting the free exercise of religion--especially for 
naval personnel at sea--and preserving "the safety of civil society.n 96 
It is noteworthy that the report of the House Judiciary Committee is 
colored by a presumption of continuity between the Articles of 
Confederation and the Constitution: 
What is an establishment of religion? It must have a creed, 
defining what a man must believe; it must have rites and 
ordinances, which believers must observe; it must have ministers of 
defined qualifications, to teach the doctrines and administer the 
rites; it must have tests for the submissive and penalties for the 
non-conformist. There never was an established religion without 
all these. Is there now, or has there ever been, any thing of this 
in the appointment of chaplains in Congress, or army, or navy? The 
practice before the adoption of that Constitution is much the same 
as since. . . . 
When the Constitution was formed, Congress had power to raise and 
support armies, and to provide for and support a navy, and to make 
rules and regulations for the government and regulations of land 
and naval forces. In the absence of all limitations, general or 
special, is it not fair to assume that they were to do these 
substantially in the same manner as had been done before? If so, 
then they were as truly empowered to appoint chaplains as to 
appoint generals or to enlist soldiers. Accordingly, we find 
provision for chaplains in the acts of 1791, of 1812, and of 1838. 
By the last there is to be one to each brigade in the army; the 
number is limited to thirty, and these in the most destitute 
places. The §?aplain is also to discharge the duties of 
schoolmaster. 
But new issues came to the fore during and immediately following 
the Civil War. 
Transformation 
Sectional tensions were already near the breaking point when a 
third great wave of religious revivalism began spreading through the 
country. The severity of the Civil War was compounded by the confusion 
of religious loyalties associated with it. Elements on both sides 
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treated the conflict as a religious crusade. The Presbyterian, 
Methodist, and Baptist denominations split along sectional lines. After 
the war, a spirit of self~righteous vengeance held the upper hand during 
the political "reconstruction" that followed. 98 
The war was also followed by a growing controversy over the place 
of Christianity in the republic. In response to the national crisis, 
the National Reform Association was founded in 1864 to restore the Bible 
to public schools, uphold Sunday laws, and lobby for a proposed 
Christian Amendment to the Constitution. 99 
In 1865, after the newly organized National Unitarian Conference 
committed the denomination to the "Lordship of Christ," dissidents 
bolted and formed the Free Religious Association in 1867. Francis 
Ellingwood Abbot organized a political arm called the National Liberal 
League and lobbied for complete separation of church and state. One of 
its fruits was an amendment sponsored in 1875 by Sen. James A. Blaine 
that would have prohibited state religious establishments and tax 
support for religious schools. 100 Although both major political parties 
endorsed a separation of church and state in their 1876 platforms, the 
bill failed the Senate. Like the Christian Amendment, the Blaine 
Amendment was introduced on numerous occasions but failed each time. 101 
Such attempts to rewrite the Constitution or rewrite history were 
symptomatic of the much greater political and cultural changes that were 
already beginning to rewrite both. The War Between the States 
represents a watershed event in American history. The political 
revolution that accompanied it produced an unprecedented concentration 
of power in the central government. 102 One contemporary observer, 
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Bernard Janin Sage, who served as one of the counsel to Jefferson Davis, 
wrote a lengthy defense of the constitutional theory of state 
sovereignty "upon which the anti-slavery sentiment of the country based 
itself, in opposing the extension of slavery, the fugitive slave law, 
and, indeed, slavery itself; while it supports the action (except 
nullifying), of those states which have from time to time defended 
themselves against federal excesses." 103 Like Judge Perkins of Indiana, 
Sage opposed centralizing tendencies and quoted with approval a warning 
by Edmund Burke: "'This change,' said he, 'from an immediate state of 
procuration and delegation, to a course of acting as from original 
power, is the way in which all the popular magistracies of the world 
have been perverted from their purposes.'" 104 
The industrial revolution of the prewar years was followed by a 
postwar commercial revolution that led to great concentrations of 
financial and industrial capital through the retooling of existing legal 
forms, such as the trust and the corporation, and the creation of 
sympathetic regulatory agencies. The intellectual revolution that grew 
out of the romantic and transcendentalist movements of earlier decades 
found a new impetus in the application of the latest scientific 
developments to the study and reform of society. Colleges that had been 
founded to train ministers and missionaries were converted to supplying 
the new professions--medicine, law, engineering, management, education, 
and social work--with a new social status, a respectable scientific 
rationale, and trained specialists. Thus the American university system 
was born. 105 
These new challenges required immediate attention and probably left 
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little time for considering specifically religious or ecclesiastical 
issues. At the state level, the customary religious accommodation 
remained outwardly intact. Little changed except for occasional 
modifications of Sunday laws to moderate certain inconveniences. At the 
national level, few religious controversies were brought before the High 
Court. But when the Court adopted a more active conception of its 
responsibilities and began involving itself in a battery of religious 
issues in the 1940s, it had new interpretative tools at its disposal. 
It immediately addresed itself to two general categories: free exercise 
cases involving unpopular religious minorities, particularly the 
Jehovah's Witnesses, and establishment cases involving primary and 
secondary schools. The precedents set during this period appear to have 
been the opening wedge in a major redefinition by the federal judiciary 
f th l f l . . . bl . l . f 1 06 o e p ace o re lglon ln pu lC l e. 
In summary, the political and cultural history of the first century 
of the constitutional era was dominated by a decisively Christian 
framework of assumptions and values. The framers of the Constitution 
and judges of the state courts appear to have made a conscious effort to 
harmonize a genuine commitment to religious liberty with an equally 
strong devotion to basic Christian values and practices. They left no 
suggestion that the temporal laws of men and nations should ever be 
permitted to contradict or supersede the revealed will of God in the 
Bible. In fact, they continued to rely on the Bible as an authoritative 
textbook of law and political theory to which all sides could--and 
frequently did--appeal. 
Even so, this same century was marked by profound political and 
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religious changes that eventually exploded the common framework of 
values and redrew the political and religious map of the country. Novel 
interpretations of the Constitution and the Bible that brought basic 
points of doctrine into question were introduced into public 
discussions. The net effects of such gradually unfolding changes, 
however, were so imperceptible and disjointed as to reassure all but the 
most vigilant souls of their continuity with tradition. This was 
t · 1 1 t f th t · t t · 1 1 07 1 · · 1 08 and par lCU ar y rue o e cons l u lona , re lglous, 
educational changes that quietly refashioned the cultural landscape of 
America. While the nature of the transformation has come to be more 
widely recognized, it has long since become practically irreversible. 109 
\-Jri ting in 1946, Ed-vmrd S. Corwin characterized the transformation 
thus: 
The Constitution of 1789, even though not originally designed as 
such, early became primarily a Constitution of Rights, and hence 
structurally a Constitution of checks and balances ... 
The Constitution of the present year of grace, 1946, is by contrast 
a Constitution of Powers, one that exhibits a growing concentration 
of power in the hands, first, of the National Government; secondly, 
in the hands of the President and the administrative agencies. Nor 
is the source of this Constitution of Powers at all obscure. It is 
the Constitution of World War I pruned of a few excrescences like 
Presidentially created agencies, "directives," and "indirect 
sanctions," and adapted to peacetime uses in an era whose primary 
deman~ is195 longer the protection of rights but the assurance of 
securlty. 
If Corwin was correct in claiming that a "change of attitude toward 
constitutional values" took place during this period which was "nothing 
short of revolutionary," an event of such magnitude might be registered 
in a variety of ways. Corwin studied its effects in terms of the war 
power. Others focused on the power to regulate commerce. While civil 
liberties considerations also evoked great concern during this period, 
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it was more in terms of direct invasions of personal liberties than with 
a view to the erosion of their constitutional presuppositions. An 
overview of the history of Supreme Court cases on religion might very 
well yield valuable insights into these larger constitutional changes. 
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as held by the more intelligent, underwent decided changes, the old 
Puritan phraseology was still generally preserved, and the old Puritan 
doctrines, in consequence, still kept their hold, to a great extent, on 
the mass of the people. Yet remarkable local modifications of opinion 
were silently produced by individual ministers, the influence of the 
abler Latitudinarian divines being traceable to this day in the 
respective places of their settlement. The growth of Latitudinarianism 
was the natural fruit of that doctrine of the Puritan fathers, the 
necessity of a learned ministry. That learning on which they relied 
against papist and prelatic superstition on the one hand, and Antinomian 
enthusiasm on the other, could not but react on themselves. As the 
exalted religious imagination of New England subsided to the common 
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level, as reason and moral sense began to struggle against the 
overwhelming pressure of religious awe, a party inevitably appeared 
which sought by learned glosses to accommodate the hard text of the 
Scriptures and the hard doctrines of the popular creed to the altered 
state of the public mind." Richard Hildreth, The History of the United 
States, vol. 2 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1856), pp. 309-11. 
Political and social reform--what Octavius Frothingham termed "the 
religion of humanity"--was becoming the religion of Hildreth's 
contemporaries. Hildreth's analysis is even more caustically echoed, 
but perhaps overstated, by Herbert Schneider, who displayed little 
sympathy for the new "genteel tradition" and none for the declining 
orthodoxy. Schneider went so far as to characterize the change as a 
"revolution" and "the beginning of a new religion," claiming that "it is 
the secularization of democracy, the dethronement of God, the unholiness 
of the commonwealth, that marks a revolution." Herbert Wallace 
Schneider, The Puritan Mind (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1930; Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1958), pp. 94-101. On the 
political overtones of the schism between the Unitarians and 
Trinitarians, see Jacob C. Meyer, Church and State in Massachusetts From 
1740 to 1833: A Chapter in the History of the Development of Individual 
Freedom (Cleveland: Western Reserve University Press, 1930), pp. 
160-183; Charles Warren, Jacobin and Junto: or Early American Politics 
as Viewed in the Diary of Dr. Nathaniel Ames, 1758-1822 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1931), pp. 286-311. 
109As one journalist wrote near the end of the Second World War, 
"The Revolution Was:" "There are those who have never ceased to say very 
earnestly, 'Something is going to happen to the American form of 
government if we don't watch out.' These were the innocent disarmers. 
Their trust was in words. They had forgotten their Aristotle. More 
than 2,000 years ago he wrote of what can happen within the form, when 
'one thing takes the place of another, so that the ancient laws will 
remain, while the power will be in the hands of those who have brought 
about revolution in the state.''' Garet Garrett, The People's Pottage 
(Boston: Western Islands, 1953), p. 9. A classic statement of this 
principle may be found in the third chapter of Edward Gibbon, The 
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. 1 (New York: The Modern 
Library, 1932), pp. 52-73. 
110Edward S. Corwin, Total War and the Constitution (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), pp. 170-71, 172. Charles Warren made a similar 
observation in a study of the power of Congress under the general 
welfare clause: "The words of a great American President--Grover 
Cleveland--remain as true today as when they were written in 1887, that 
'the lesson should be constantly enforced that though the people support 
the Government, the Government should not support the people.' If the 
opposite theory shall prevail in this country, if the people are to be 
taught to look to the Government for their support, if the Government is 
to assume to defray the needs of its individual citizens, then one 
result will inevitably follow: Elections will become a mere barter of 
promises of Government appropriations; competitive promises of public 
provender will take the place of competing political principles; and 
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those candidates for office who promise to the voters the most 
Government support will receive the most support from the voters." 
Charles Warren, Congress as Santa Claus or National Donations and the 
General Welfare Clause of the Constitution (Charlottesville, Va.: The 
Michie Company, 1932), p. 145. The reference to Grover Cleveland is to 
that President's veto of the Texas Seed Bill, an appropriation of 
$10,000 for the distribution of seeds to drought-stricken farmers. For 
the text of the veto message, see George F. Parker, ed., The Writings 
and Speeches of Grover Cleveland (New York: Cassell Publishing Company, 
1892), pp. 449-451. Arthur Selwyn Miller, who views these developments 
more favorably, has used the concept of a Constitution of Powers as a 
point of departure for outlining the contours of "the Positive State." 
He has concluded that the "constitutional revolution" reflects the 
"flexibility" and "theological nature" of the original charter. Arthur 
Selwyn Miller, "Constitutional Revolution Consolidated: The Rise of the 
Positive State," The George Washington Law Review, 35 (December 1966): 
172-90. Similar observations on "the emergence of the Second Republic" 
may be found in Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second 
Republic of the United States, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1979), pp. 273-94. 
